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JURISDICTION
Jurisdict'sn of this Court to hear this appeal is conrerred
by Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and by Rule
3 of the Ruies of the Utah Court of Appeals.

I 5SUES

1. A "pro se" cannot be held to the same stringent
standards as a law-trained attorney.
2. There was not sufficient evidence or "Practicing Medicine
without a License to convict defendant.
3. The "Medical Practice Act" does not apply to persons who
practice the "healing arts."
4-. Plaintiff was required to affirmatively prove that
Defendant was outside the exceptions to tne criminal statute,
given his religious ana other status in the community.
5. Section UCA 56-12-30 is unconstitutionally overbroad ana
unc1 ear.
6. The trial Court erred in allowing inflammatory,
prejudicial, irrelevant testimony to be introduced against the
defendant.
7. The denial of the Motion for New Trial, was an aouse or
discretion by the trial Court.

STATEMENT OF AUTHORITIES
"License-several classes-Definitions.--The
following classes of licenses shall be
1

issued:
vi; To Practice medicine and surgery in
all Dranches thereof•
<2)
(a; To practice as an osteopathic
physician without operative surgery in
accordance with the tenets of a profession
school of osteopathy recognized by tne
aepartment or registration.
(fo) To practice as an osteopathic
physician ana surgeon in accordance with the
tenets of a professional school of osteopathy
recognized by the department or registration.
(3) To practice the treatment of human
ailments in accordance with the tenets of the
professional school, college or institution
recognized by the department of registration
of which the applicant is a graduate as
designated in his application for license,
but without the use of drugs or medicine and
without operative surgery.
"Drugs and
medicine" as used herein shall mean articles
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease for wnicn an authorized prescription
is required by law. Such articles shall not
include devices or their component parts,
intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment or prevention for
disease for which an authorized prescription
is not required by law,
(4) To practice the treatment of human
ailments in accoraance with the tenets of the
professional school, college or institution
recognizea by the department of registration
of which the applicant is a graduate as
designated in his application for license,
including the practice of obstetrics and tne
use or drugs ana medicine, but without
operative surgery, except operative minor
surgery.
The term "operative minor surgery"
means the use of electrical or other methods
of the surgical repair and care incident
thereto of superficial laceration and
abrasion, oenign superficial lesions and the
removal of foreign bodies located in the
superficial structures; and the use of
antiseptics and local anesthetics in
connection therewith but it shall not include
any surgery which requires blood transfusion
or the entry into the abdominal or thoracic
cavity or cranium.
K5) T O practice obstetrics if a valid
2

oostetrics license has been issued ana is in
rorce prior to the effective date of this act
for sucn practice."
Utah Code Annotated 58-12-3 (1953; as amended (emphasis added)
w

'Practicing medicine" der ined-Except ions.-Any person who shall diagnose, treat or
profess to treat or prescribe or advise for,
any physical or mental ailment of, or any
physical injury to, or any deformity of,
another: or who shall operate upon another
for any ailment, injury or deformity, shall
be regarded as practicing medicine or
treating human ailments. But nothing in this
section shall be construed to include the
foil owing cases:
<, 1 > The administration of domestic or family
remedies in case of emergency. * * *
Utah Code Annotated 58-12-17 (1953) as amended

(emphasis added)

Medical Practice Act-Definitions--As used in
this act, suolect to the exemptions or
section 56-12-29:* * *
^2) The word 'diagnose' means to examine
in any manner another person, parts of a
person's body, substance, riuids, or
materials excreted, taken or removed from a
person's body, or produce by a person's body,
to determine the source nature, kind or
extent or a disease or other physical or
mental condition, or to attempt to so examine
or to determine, or to hold oneself out or
represent that an examination or
determination is being made or to make an
examination or determination upon or from
information supplied directly or indirectly
by another person, whether or not in tne
presence of the person making or attempting
the diagnosis.
v3) The words "drugs or medicine" mean
articles, chemicals or compounds or
biological preparations intended tor internal
or external use by man or intended to be used
for diagnosis, cure, mitigation or prevention
of diseases or abnormalities of man as
recognized in any published United States
Pharmacopoeia or National Formulary, or
otherwise established as a arug or medicine.
(4) The words "practice of medicine'1
mean:
u ) To diagnose, treat, correct, advise
3

or prescribe for any human disease, ailment*
injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other
condition, physical or mental, real or
imaginary, by means or instrumentality:
(b) To maintain an office or place of
business for the purpose of doing any of the
acts described in subsection (a) whether or
not for compensation;
(c) to use, in the conduct of any
occupation or profession pertaining to the
diagnosis or treatment of human diseases or
conditions in any printed material,
stationery, letterhead, envelopes, signs,
advertisements the designation "doctor,"
"doctor of medicine," "physician," "surgeon,"
"physician or surgeon," "Dr.," "M*D." or any
combination, of these designation, uniess the
designation additionally contains the
description of the oranch of the healing arts
for which the person has a license."
Utah Code Annotated

56-12-28 (1953) as amended vempnasis added)

Medical Practice Act-Practice of medicine
without a license a Felony-Exceptions.
"It is uniawrui to engage in the practice or
medicine in this state without firs obtaining
a license. Any person who engages in the
practice of medicine without a license is
guilty of a felony; except the rollowing
persons may engage in activities included in
the practice or medicine suoiect to the
circumstance and limitations stated: * * »
(^) any individual rendering aid in an
emergency, when no fee or other consideration
of value ror the service is contemplated,
charged or received;
<5> any individual administering a
domestic or family remedy including those
persons engaged in the sale of vitamins,
health ror or health food supplements, herb
or other products of nature, except drugs or
medicines for which an authorized
prescription is required by law;
(6) a person engaged in good faith in
the practice or the religious tenets or any
church or religious belief without the use of
any drugs or medicines ror which an
authorized prescription is required by law;*
* *"

Utah Code Annotated 56-12-30 (1953) as amended (emphasis added)
4

"M^dioal Practice Act-Scop« of aot.-This
chapter is designed solely for the regulation
of the practice or medicine and does not
apply to the regulation of * * *the healing
arts, * * * and this act shall not change or
limit the rights or persons lawfully
practicing the otner healing arts with
respect to the practice of their professions
* * *tf

Utan Ooae Annotated 56-12-56 t, 1953 J as amended lemphasis added)

STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature or Case
This appeal is taken rrom a Judgment or Criminal
Conviction, in which the defendant, Stanley Maistrom, was
Convicted of a Third Degree Felony, "Practicing Medicine without
a License".

Proceedings
1. Trial of this matter was heard on August 31, 1989, at
which time judgment of conviction was enterea.
2. Motion for New Trial was filed on October 9, 1969.
3. Said Motion was denied on October 24, 1969, at which
time defendant was sentenced.
4. Notice of Appeal was riled on November 22, 1969.
5. No previous or other appeal has been filed or heard in
this matter.

5

FACTS
i. Stanley Malstrom is an herbalist, and an acupressurist,
who practices tenets of the L.D.S. religion, specifically as it
relates to the Word or Wisdom,
2. On or about October 29, 1989, Carol Marshali, came to
Mr. Maistrom's home, complaining or digestive problems.

This

visit was arranged through friends of Mr. Malstrom's, the
Tishner's, and her husband, and was at the special request or
same.
3. Complainant, Ms. Marshall, told Mr. Malstrom or her
troubles and requested that he lay his hands on her.
4. Mr. Maistrom, did perform the service, ana suggested to
Ms. Marshall
and

that she might be better off with an improved diet

a "green drink"

(a mixture of vegetables, and pineapple

known to many as a soothing substance for the digestive system).
5. Ms. Marshall never paid for any or the above services,
nor were any drugs, prescribed, although sne was told by Mr.
Malstrom, at one point that she may have a sinus infection, and
she should see her physician.
6. Subsequent to her visit to Mr. Maistrom, Ms. Marshall
filed a Civil suit against him alleging that he had damaged
fusion in her vertebrae, which action has not, to date, been
tried, nor judgment entered.
7. On or about

March 29, 1959 the State of Utah filed

charges against Mr. Malstrom alleging "Practicing Medicine
without a License", in which the civil Plaintiff, Carol Marshall
6

was the complainant.
6. Mr. Maistrom appeared "pro se" at his trial on August
31, 1989, and was convicted of the charge.
9. Subsequent to the trial, Mr. Maistrom retained Robert
Macri as an attorney, and Mr. Maori filed a Motion for New Trial
on October 9, 1989.
10. Hearing on tne Motion for New Trial was heard on
October 2^, 1989, which motion was denied, and Mr. Maistrom
sentenced.
11. Due to problems in communication, Macri, has since
withdrawn, leaving Maistrom to pursue this case "pro se r .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State argues that the exceptions contained in the
various sections or the "Medical Practice Act" are merely
affirmative defenses and not elements of proof which the state
must establish; and further that the state need not prove ail
elements of the case in order to sustain conviction, and yet even
the trial Court recognized the State's need to establish just
these things.

Not only were there elements of the charge to

which no evidence was present or established the State railed to
show that the exceptions did not apply.
Maistrom was not required to show case iaw to support his
claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, a simple showing or the applications which might be
construed; under the instant application, is sufficient.
The State further ignores the fact that due to the
7

irrelevant testimony allowed to be entered in the trial Court,
the Court overlooked the unreliability of lis. Marshall's
testimony.
Furthermore, "pro se's" cannot be held as strictly
knowledgeable in Courtroom procedure.

It is true that they must

make the proper objections ana file the appropriate papers (whic
Malstrom did throughout;, the Court must extend "reasonable
consideration" to his acts.

ARGUMENT
A "pro se" cannot be held to the same stringent
standards as a law-trained attorney.
As the State notes in its brief «,page 11.) the doctrine
establishea in Nelson v Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207. 1213 ^Utah
1953), that the Court is expected to extend a little extra
consideration to the layman acting in his own defense.

This

requirement is endorsed by Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, ^as
wei1 as many other Feaeral case; which require a much iess
stringent application of the rules to "pro se's".

Malstrom

raised adequate objections to all irrelevant testimony presented
by the State at the trial.

His objections were renewed at the

proper time and ail of them are adequately preserved as issues on
appeal.

His inartfu1lness and lack of technical Knowledge does

not stand against him.

In all other ways he has met his

obligations and the requirements of procedure.

This Court has

often realized that a "pro se" is to be allowed a little extra
guidance from the Court, if such can be done without damaging tne
8

Court* s impartiality.

There was not sufficient evidence of "Practicing Medicine
without a License to convict defendant.
According to the established law "Fenai statutes are within
the operation of tne general rule that statues in pari materia
should be construea together,

Unaer this ruie. statutes in

relation to the same offense must oe taken together ana construed
as is the matters to wnich they relate were emoracea in a single
statute," 75 Am Our 2d 305 (Statutes Section 505;.

Aii of tne

Utah Statutes relating to the practice of medicine with the
definitions and exceptions therein, must be consiaered as part
and parcel of U.C.A. 56-12-30 (Supp. 1986) which Maistrom was
charged with violating.

Therefore the definition of "Practicing

Medicine", as found in U.C.A. 55-12-17 (1953) as amended: as well
as those found in U.C.A. 55-12-36 (1953; as amendea. must be
taken into

account by the trial judge.

Clearly, as Maistrom has

previously argued, the State not only failed to prove some of tne
elements of Practicing Medicine as found in those aefinitions,
but further failed to present evidence of tnose and otner
elements.

The oniy evidence conclusively established, without

contradictory testimony was that the Tishner's suggested that Ms.
Marshall visit Maistrom due to complaints she had expressed to
Tischners many times; that Maistrom, massaged her ana suggested
she eat a more healthy diet, and drink a "green arinK" and take a
"garlic enema," and that she visit her doctor.

The Marshal Is'

both testified that Maistrom had "twisted" Ms. Marshall's neck,
9

but the Tishners' both testified that he did not.

Both Ms.

Marshall and Mr. Marshall admitted that Malstrom did not
^proscribe'1 drugs ror Ms. Marsnai, as required oy the statutory
definition "Practicing Medicine" u n a

the statutory aerinition of

"proscribe";; but merely suggested a vegetable concoction caiied
a "green drink," and vitamins. vT. 25, and 46) Both

testified

that Malstrom's so called "treatment" consisted of massage or
accupressure

iT. 23 and 4 6 ) .

Both testified that Maistrom aid

not "hold himself out" as a doctor. (T 22 and 47;.

Mr. Marshall,

as well as Mrs. Tishner denied that Malstrom "diagnosed"
Marshall

(T. 36 and 47;

Mrs.

, Even Ms. Marshall's testimony that

Maistrom said she had a "messed up pancreas" (T. 22) is a poor
example of "diagnoses" as even the state defined it. (T. 50; Tne
State railed to submit any evidence or maintaining an office or
using a title implying that Malstrom was a doctor, or even that
he ever said he was a doctor.
it is oovious, that the statutes, when taKen in tneir
entirety, cieariy define the actions wnich constitute the
elements of practicing medicine without a license as;
i. Diagnose.
2. Treat.
3. Suggest.
4. Proscr ibe.
5. Correct.
6. Holding one's self out to be a doctor.
7. Maintaining an office to do all of the aoove.
and of course,
6. Doing the aoove, without a license to do so.
It is clear that the State failed to prove the majority of
the elements.

The Court even while recognizing the necessity to

10

examine ail of the elements, ana declaring Ms. Marshall as "the
victim" disregarded the only testimony

(Ms. Marshall's)

concerning the contents of the "green drink." (T. 2 3 ) .
The State now argues that because the "green drink" was not
harmrui has nothing to do with the element of "proscribe."
However, the case law is clear: if an average person would have
the articles in their home, a person can not be claimea to be
proscribing them, and therefore, need not nave a license to
recommena them.

It would seem that the state does not believe

the average person would have vegetables and gariic in tneir
home, or that they would not know how to use a blender or enema
bottle.

In State v. liee Foo bun. 45 Utah 531, 147 p. 465, 491

<1915). from whicn one or our definitions comes rrom, the
Deiendant proscribed among other things ginseng, licorice and
saspariila; such articles wouid not be common in the average
person"s nome.
The State rurther suggests that suggesting that Ms. Marshall
had a "messed up pancreas" is the same as recognizing

disease

such as was done by Mr. Hoffman in State v. Horrman. 733 P.2d
502, 505 (Utah 1987;, wherein the defendant told tne complainant
that he was suffering from "chemical poisoning, and stomach
ulcers:"

which certainly claimed to clearly recognize tne CAUSE

of the disease or problem. Nothing in Malstrom's actions or words
even implied he knew what was wrong.
Marshall

Kit

Even when teliing Ms.

indeed he did) that she had a sinus inrection. did

not imply he was certain of tne cause given the fact ne also told

11

her she should see her doctor to find out*

Plaintiff was required to affirmatively prove that Defendant
was outside the exceptions to the criminal statute, given his
religious and other status in the community.
The State contends that the exceptions to the penal statute
are merely affirmative derenses which the derendant could
utilize.

This is not consistent with common principles of law.

According to 73 Am Jur 2d.369-390. ^Statutes, Section 19l)
"Hence, a statute should be construed in its entirety, and as a
whcie.

Ail parts or the act should be considered, ana construea

together. It is not permissible to rest a construction on any one
part aione."

Thererore. not only must the Court take into

consideration all of the different statutes which relate to the
"practice or Medicine", but further, the Court must consider ail
of the exceptions.

It is clear that the effect of express

exceptions to a penai statute is "that an exception in a statute
amounts to an affirmation of the application of it's provisions
to ail other cases not excepted, and excludes all other
exceptions." 73 Am Jur 2d 466. (Statutes, Section 316).

The

state was required to affirmatively prove the exceptions did not
apply.

"More accurately, it may be said that such tpenalD laws

are to be interpreted strictly against the state and liberally in
favor of the accused.

73 Am Jur 2d 451, (Statutes, Section 293).

Section UCA 58-12-30 is unconstitutionally overbroad and
unci ear.
it is obvious, as Maistrom previously argued, that U.C.A.
12

56-12-30, (1953) as amended, is on its race unconstitutionally
overbroad and vague.

In the case of Logan City v. Huber, 785

P.2d 1372 vUtah App. 1990 J, the Court struck down a city
ordinance because it's language reached into constitutionally
protected areas or behavior.

The Court, in that case refused to

apply the law to Huoer or any one else.

The giving of free

advise; as Maistrom did, is a constitutionally protected
activity, under the First Amendment of the United Sates
Constitution.

And further, a person who gives a massage or other

help when called upon to ao so, by the individual he helps, can
not be held criminally liable without violating the same area of
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of association, both for the
accusea and the complainant.

Ms. Marshall came to Maistrom, and

asked for help, he did nothing but supply what neip ne could.
For him to be held criminally liable is lucrative, and would
indicate that any person who is asked to help another, (as
examples previously submitted in Appellant's initial brier);
should think twice before doing so.

Should the chicken soup oe

distasteful; should the business partner fail to straighten the
back, both civil and criminal charges might ensue.
The trial Court erred in allowing inflammatory, prejudicial,
irrelevant testimony to be introduced against the defendant.
The State argues that Paul Jacobson's ana Dr. Gaurin's
testimony was relevant and admissible "to corroborate Mrs.
Marshall's testimony."

The State fails to recognize that all

these witnesses corroborated was what Mrs. Marshall TOLD them.
They had no personal knowledge concerning the actions of the
13

defendant-they were merely told.

Even then all tney coniirmed

was that Mrs, Marshall was experiencing recurring

difficulties

with the neck which she claimed Malstrom had. caused

veven though

she had been to see Jacoosen ror the very same prooiem prior to
her visit to Malstrom)

This is all third hand. Hearsay,

inrormation wnich is not admissible, at ail, in a Court or law.
The effect of their testimony served only to inflame the Court's
sensibilities to consider Mrs. Marshall a "victim.11

The fact

that she had visited Jacobsen; with the same complaint, prior to
her visit with Malstrom was overlooked, by the Court, in it's
sympathy for her.

Had this not been the case, the Court wouid

have recognized her O D V I O U S
have put iess weight on it.
obviously prejudiced

inconsistent testimony, ana wouid
Ms. Marshall and her husoand were

u n a coached;; by the ract that a win in

criminal court would aid their civil action.

Taken together, trie

testimony of these two witnesses, ano ail other testimony, failed
to establish the elements of "practicing Medicine without a
License:" but with the inflammatory nature or this purely
irrelevant, hearsay testimony, the Court managed to have too much
sympathy for Ms. Marshall, even to the extent of disregarding the
inconsistencies between her testimony and Jacobsen's. her
testimony ana her husband's, as well as the

inconsistencies

between her testimony and the Tishners'.

CONCLUSION
The State has grossly failed to prove it's case, ana merely

14

won because it took unfair advantage of Maistrom's technical
inabilities.

The State's attorney purposely inflamed the Court's

sympathies through introduction of irrelevant testimony, to which
Maistrom appropriately objected.

The State did not conclusively

prove the elements nor did it prove the exceptions did not appiy.
it was only oy taking unrair advantage, that this conviction was
obtained.

Even Mr. Jones ^the State Attorney) admitted that he

diet not think this was a serious case ^T. 51;. but nonetheless.
he sought conviction.

He got one-but he should never nave

succeeded, given the facts of this case.
WHEREFORE, Appellant asks this Court to reverse his
conviction and return to him the monies he has already advanced
in payment of the fine.
Dated this 20th day of August, 1990.
Respectfuliy

submitted
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